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Abstract
We study how and to what extent private households are aected by the recent
nancial crisis and how their nancial decisions are inuenced by this shock. Our
analysis reveals that individuals with low levels of nancial literacy are less likely to
have invested in the stock market and thus are less likely to report losses in wealth.
Yet, individuals with low nancial literacy are more likely to sell their assets which
lost in value (realize losses). This reaction to short-term losses has potential long-
term consequences if individuals do not participate in markets' recovery and face
lower returns in the long run.
Keywords: nancial literacy, cognitive ability, nancial crisis, life-cycle savings, sav-
ing behavior, portfolio choice
JEL Classication: D91, D14, G115
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Non-technical Summary
We study how and to what extent private households are aected by the recent
nancial crisis and how their nancial decisions are inuenced by this shock. We aim
at answering the following questions: Are individuals with lower nancial literacy and
lower cognitive abilities more frequently aected by nancial losses due to the crisis? Are
individuals with lower nancial literacy and cognitive abilities aected more severely if
loss is measured as a percentage of wealth? And are individuals with lower nancial
literacy and cognitive abilities more likely to realize their losses?
Our analysis is based on SAVE, a representative panel of German households that
contains very detailed information on their nancial and socio-economic situation as well
as nancial literacy and cognitive abilities. We use information from the surveys con-
ducted in the early summers of 2007, 2008, and 2009 and make extensive use of a special
module of questions regarding the nancial crisis that was added to the questionnaire
in 2009.
Using self-reports, little more than 20% of households in Germany were aected
by nancial losses due to the nancial crisis. On average households lost about 2,561
Euros or 3.6% of their nancial assets. Simulated losses based on households portfolio
composition at the end of 2007 and average returns of these assets during 2008 are
relatively close to the self-reported measure.
Ex ante, the relation between nancial literacy and losses is not clear. On the
one hand individuals with lower literacy and cognitive ability are more prone to make
mistakes; on the other hand they are more likely to stay out of risky assets. Our analysis
based on SAVE reveals that individuals with low levels of nancial knowledge are less
likely to have invested in the stock market and are therefore in general less likely to report
losses in wealth due to the nancial crisis. The eect of nancial literacy is signicant
even if we control for socio-demographic dierences, risk preferences and income risk.
In contrast to our expectations we nd that individuals with low nancial literacy did
not suer larger losses measured as a fraction of their wealth. However, individuals with
lower levels of nancial literacy were more likely to sell their assets which lost in value
and thus realize their losses for sure. This reaction of individuals with low nancial
literacy to short-term losses can have substantial long-term consequences for wealth
distribution if these individuals do not participate in markets' recovery and face lower
returns in the long run.6
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1 Introduction
The recent nancial downturn and economic crisis provided a major challenge for nan-
cial institutions, politicians, companies and private households around the world. We use
the nancial crisis as a natural experiment to study to what extent private households
are aected and how they react to such a shock? Are nancially literate and individuals
with higher IQ better prepared to shield themselves from shocks like the nancial and
economic crisis? This question is dicult to assess because individuals with higher levels
of expertise are more likely to invest in risky assets, which were particularly aected by
declines in value during the nancial crisis. Therefore we do not only focus on the losses
in wealth individuals incurred during the crisis but additionally analyze if households
realized their losses for sure by selling assets.
Our analysis is based on SAVE, a representative panel of German households that
contains very detailed information on their nancial and socio-economic situation as well
as nancial literacy and cognitive abilities. We use information from the surveys con-
ducted in the early summers of 2007, 2008, and 2009 and make extensive use of a special
module of questions regarding the nancial crisis that was added to the questionnaire
in 2009. Germany is particularly suited for our analysis because there was no housing
or mortgage crisis in 2007/2008. Thus, the losses (or gains) in wealth of households
are purely related to the composition of nancial portfolios and their adjustments in
the course of the crisis. While households with a large share of equity in their portfolio
are likely to have suered from the economic downturn, households could gain higher
returns on time deposits, saving accounts and government bonds at the same time.1
Our analysis reveals that individuals with low levels of nancial knowledge are less
likely to have invested in the stock market and are therefore less likely to report losses
in wealth due to the nancial crisis. Thus, we conrm the nding by Calvet et al.
(2007) and van Rooij et al. (2007) that individuals with low levels of nancial knowledge
stay out of risky assets. We nd no eect of nancial literacy and IQ on the size
of the loss conditional on participation in risky asset markets. However, individuals
with lower levels of nancial expertise sold the assets which have lost in value with a
1The German DAX, which measures the development of the 30 largest and best-performing com-
panies on the German equity market and represents around 80% of the market capital authorized in
Germany (http://deutsche-boerse.com) dropped by about 40% during 2008. In contrast to this the
returns on private deposits with a duration of less than 2 years increased from an average of 3.6% in
2007 to an average 4.25% in 2008 (http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik).7
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higher likelihood. This means that they did not only incur paper losses but realized
their losses for sure. This reaction to a shock like the nancial crisis potentially has
substantial consequences for wealth distribution. Households with less nancial expertise
and cognitive abilities did not participate in markets' recovery. Moreover, if individuals
shy away from risky investments or feel conrmed in their scepticism towards nancial
markets, they will face lower long-term returns.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we give a brief overview of the
literature on household investment behavior and develop our hypotheses. Section 3
describes the SAVE data and the variables used for our analysis. In section 4 we report
our empirical results. We conclude in section 5 with a brief discussion.
2 Related Literature and Hypotheses
2.1 Stock Market Participation
One of the central ndings of capital market theory is that every household should invest
part of their wealth in risky assets in order to prot from the risk premium.2 Over the
life-cycle the absolute amount of assets held in stocks should increase until retirement
and decrease thereafter. Without xed cost of stock market participation the relative
amount of stocks in the portfolio should decrease with age; young investors should hold
100% of their assets in stocks.3 These results persist even when controlling for in-
come risk and other background risks.4 Empirical examinations of households' portfolio
choice reveal that many households do not hold equity.5 This phenomenon is known as
the stock market participation puzzle. One of the arguments put forward to explain the
2This result is based on Markowitz (1952), Merton (1969, 1971), and Samuelson (1969). For a
comprehensive overview of the literature on strategic asset allocation see Campbell and Viceira (2003)
as well as Curcuru et al. (2004).
3See Campbell and Viceira (2003) based on Campbell et al. (2001).
4See e.g. Cocco et al. (2005), Curcuru et al. (2004).
5See e.g. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Guiso et al. (2003), and Christelis,
Jappelli and Padula (2010) for international evidence. B orsch-Supan and Essig (2003) nd that only
around 17% of German households directly participate in the stock market. The amount would increase
when including indirect stock holdings, however, the authors argue that there is a large overlap between
direct and indirect stock holders. Christelis, Geogarakos and Haliassos (2010) nd that around 25% of
the households older than 50 in Germany own stocks directly or indirectly. Based on aggregate data,
Ramb and Scharnagl (2010) report that the share of direct equity holdings in German households'
portfolios moved around 5% since the burst of the \dot com bubble" in 2000. The fraction of mutual
funds in portfolios was around 14% in recent years.8
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reluctance of households to invest in risky assets is the existence of xed participation
cost (e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Vissing-Jorgensen
(2002, 2003), and Calvet et al. (2007)). Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) nd that stock mar-
ket participation increases with income and education. They argue that this is in line
with the existence of participation cost because, rstly, high income households have
larger portfolios and can aord to pay the xed participation cost, and secondly, the
cost of information acquisition is lower for highly educated households. However, they
also nd that even among households with more than $100,000 of liquid assets partici-
pation in equity is below 50% and conclude that information cost must be substantial or
non-economic reasons inuence households' behavior. The introduction of a xed cost
of stock market participation in the model of Campbell and Viceira (2003) merely shifts
stock market entry to later ages but does not fundamentally change the predictions of
the model. Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and (2003) estimates that a xed participation
cost of around 50 dollars in 2003 can explain non-participation of half the households in
her sample. Andersen and Nielsen (2010) nd that xed entry and participation costs
in monetary terms can account for roughly one third of non-participation in the stock
market. They conclude that participation seems to be inuenced by other factors like
for example behavioral biases and cognitive abilities. The authors show that the proba-
bility of participation in the stock market after a windfall gain is signicantly higher for
educated and nancially literate individuals. This is in line with other studies which nd
evidence that in particular individuals with lower nancial knowledge and lower cognitive
abilities are less likely to participate in the stock market.6 In particular, Grinblatt et al.
(2010) nd evidence that even among the most auent individuals higher IQ increases
stock market participation. This implies that individuals with high nancial literacy
and high cognitive abilities face lower cost of acquiring information and thus lower par-
ticipation cost than individuals who know little about nancial markets and have low
cognitive abilities. In addition to this, Calvet et al. (2007) suggest that individuals with
low nancial literacy might be aware of their weakness and stay out of risky markets
to avoid investment mistakes like for example under-diversication. Furthermore, in-
dividuals who invest in the stock market have an incentive to acquire knowledge and
thus participants have higher levels of nancial literacy than non-participants. More-
6See e.g. Guiso and Jappelli (2005), Calvet et al. (2007), van Rooij et al. (2007), Christiansen et al.
(2008), Christelis, Jappelli and Padula (2010), McArdle et al. (2009), Cole and Shastry (2009), and
Grinblatt et al. (2010).9
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over, McArdle et al. (2009) and Cole and Shastry (2009) propose several alternative
mechanisms through which cognitive abilities and nancial education could be related
to nancial market participation. For example, time preferences simultaneously inu-
ence the investment in education and saving behavior. Thus, it is hard to determine
causality. However, for our analysis the mechanism that drives stock market participa-
tion of households is only of secondary importance. Assuming that the nancial crisis
was an unanticipated exogenous shock, nancial losses of individuals should be closely
related to stock market participation and thus, our rst hypothesis on the eect of the
crisis is:
Hypothesis 1: Households with higher nancial literacy/cognitive abilities are more
likely to hold risky assets in their portfolio (select portfolios with a higher expected return
at higher risk). Thus, they are more likely to incur losses due to the nancial crisis.
2.2 Under-Diversication and other Investment Mistakes
There is a growing literature which investigates the relationship between nancial in-
vestment mistakes, cognitive abilities and nancial literacy. The central nding is that
individuals with lower cognitive abilities and lower nancial knowledge are more likely
to suer from biases and make investment mistakes.7 Kimball and Shumway (2010) sug-
gest that the most plausible reason is that more nancially literate investors are better
informed and therefore are better at managing their portfolios.
One of the most investigated deviations of investors from optimal behavior is lack of
diversication.8 In their comprehensive study of 60,000 US brokerage accounts Goetz-
mann and Kumar (2008) for example nd that on average investors hold under-diversied
portfolios. The degree of diversication increases with age, income, education, and so-
phistication.9 Specically, they nd that under-diversied investors overestimate specic
industries, and local stocks, and are sensitive to past returns. Their annual returns were
on average 2.4% lower than those of diversied investors. Kimball and Shumway (2010)
discover that nancially literate investors are less likely to apply naive diversication
7See, e.g., Benjamin et al. (2006), Agarwal et al. (2009), Kimball and Shumway (2010).
8See, e.g., Blume and Friend (1975), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Vissing-Jorgensen
(2003), Campbell (2006), Calvet et al. (2007), Goetzmann and Kumar (2008).
9They dene sophisticated investors as those who \trade options, engage in short-selling, and have
greater investment experience"(p.435).10
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heuristics, like the 1/n rule. Moreover, they invest fewer amounts of their assets in
stocks of the company they work for; and they are less frequently suering from a home
bias. Guiso and Jappelli (2008) also nd that a lack of diversication is related to a
lack of nancial literacy. They argue that nancially illiterate investors are likely to
undervalue the benets from diversication|or even ignore them altogether|and ad-
ditionally have diculties to assess the correlation between their assets' returns. Thus,
individuals with high nancial knowledge hold a larger number of dierent assets in their
portfolio. Similarly Grinblatt et al. (2010) nd that individuals with higher IQ invest
in a larger number of dierent stocks and are more likely to hold mutual funds in their
portfolio.
Apart from this Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) nd that investors with better diver-
sication are also better at selecting stocks with higher returns, probably also because
they are better informed. The authors identify a small group of active investors who
are under-diversied and perform very well|most likely a group of very well informed
investors. Grinblatt et al. (2009) observe that high IQ investors on average earn 11%
higher returns than low IQ investors.
If nancially literate investors are better at managing their portfolios in \normal
times" they most probably were also better prepared during the nancial crisis. Thus,
we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a: Conditional on stock market participation, households with higher
nancial literacy/cognitive abilities are better at managing their portfolios. Thus, they
suer smaller losses as a percentage of their wealth.
On the other hand, Odean (1998) argues that overcondence leads investors to over-
estimate the precision of their own evaluation of signals which leads them to hold port-
folios that are more risky than the portfolios of non-overcondent investors with the
same degree of risk aversion. Barber and Odean (2001) nd that overcondent investors
trade too much and thereby lower their returns. Furthermore, they nd that men tend
to be more overcondent than women with similar sophistication. If men on average
hold riskier portfolios due to overcondence compared to women, they should have in-
curred larger losses as a fraction of their wealth compared to their female counterparts.
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b: Conditional on stock market participation, households with a male11
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decision maker are more likely to suer from overcondence compared to households
with female decision makers with a similar degree of nancial literacy and cognitive
ability. Thus, men compared to women hold riskier portfolios and incur larger losses as
a percentage of their wealth.
2.3 Portfolio Adjustments
The German stock market lost about 40% of its value in the course of 2008. On the
aggregate level a strong tendency to shift from risky to less risky assets has been observed.
Many investors sold their equity in particular at the trough of the crisis in October 2008
(Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management e.V. (2009)) and thus did not only
incur paper losses but realized their losses. The re-balancing behavior of households has
been subject to many examinations. A variety of dierent rational as well as irrational
reasons for active re-balancing have been examined for example by Odean (1998), Coval
and Shumway (2005), Locke and Mann (2005), Massa and Simonov (2005), and Calvet
et al. (2009).
In order to understand the mechanisms that were driving individuals' reactions to
the nancial crisis, we have to examine their motives. It is unclear if the realization of
losses can be seen as a nancial investment mistake from an ex ante perspective. Ex
post it seems that it would have been better not to sell assets which have lost in value
but rather buy assets when prices were low and prot from markets' recovery.
We dierentiate between selling assets due to constraints and portfolio re-balancing
caused by a change in expectations. If individuals need their funds to buer unexpected
shocks to income due to the crisis, they might have to sell assets that lost their value.
Besides smoothing consumption, households might have adjusted portfolios due to
a change in expectations. Some households might have realized their losses in order to
reduce their (future) tax burden. Moreover, if households had an ex ante rule to sell
their stock as soon as the value dropped below a certain threshold in order to avoid
suering from a disposition eect (holding losers too long and selling winners too soon),
the selling of loser stocks might have been plausible. We expect that individuals with
higher nancial literacy and cognitive abilities are more likely to apply these strategies.
On the other hand, if households sold their risky assets because they expected the
future returns to be lower permanently, they were not well informed. Households with12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1299
Febuary 2011
higher nancial knowledge should have been better informed about the long-term de-
velopment of future returns and thus were more likely not to sell their risky assets.
Moreover, investors might have suered from \myopic loss aversion" (investors give high
weight to losses compared to gains and evaluate their portfolios too often) as argued
by Benartzi and Thaler (2007) or were inuenced by an atmosphere of panic. Benartzi
and Thaler (2007) as well as Duo and Saez (2003) nd that particularly unsophisti-
cated investors are strongly inuenced by peer eects. Calvet et al. (2009) examine
re-balancing behavior of Swedish households and observe that in particular nancially
sophisticated households were less likely to exit nancial markets between 1999 and 2002
when the stock market declined. Assuming that nancial sophistication is related to -
nancial literacy and cognitive abilities one would expect individuals with low nancial
literacy/cognitive abilities to sell loser stocks more frequently.
Thus, we end up with two competing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: Households with higher nancial literacy/cognitive abilities are more
likely to realize their losses.
and
Hypothesis 3b: Households with lower nancial literacy/cognitive abilities are more
likely to realize their losses.
The empirical analysis can contribute to clarify which of the two eects prevails.
3 Data
3.1 SAVE
We use SAVE, a panel of German households that contains detailed information on
households' nancial situation and socio-economic as well as psychological characteris-
tics.10 The analysis is based on the surveys conducted in the early summer of 2007,
2008, and 2009, and we make extensive use of a special module of questions regarding
the nancial crisis which was added to the questionnaire in 2009. In 2009 there are 2,222
households in the panel.
10SAVE was rst conducted in 2001 by the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging
(MEA). Consecutive waves were in the eld in 2003/2004, and every year since 2005. A detailed
description of the scientic background, design and results of the survey can be found in B orsch-Supan
et al. (2009).13
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Due to item non-response, the SAVE data set is imputed using an iterative multiple
imputation procedure based on a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo method (Schunk (2008)).
The goal of this procedure is to increase the eciency of our estimates due to a larger
number of observations and to reduce the item non-response bias that occurs if obser-
vations with and without missing values dier systematically. For our analysis, all ve
multiply imputed data sets are used and the results are derived using Rubin's method
(Rubin (1987, 1996)). In the case of our explained variables (absolute and relative
loss) and key explanatory variables (nancial literacy and cognitive abilities), we do not
use imputed values. Thus, our basic sample consists of 2,012 households. The socio-
demographic characteristics of the sample are provided in Table C1 in the appendix.
All descriptive statistics are weighted and results are representative for the German
population.11 For the regression analyses no weights are used.12
3.2 Measuring Financial Losses
3.2.1 Reported Losses
Absolute Financial Losses. We measure losses due to the nancial crisis by directly
asking households. The question in SAVE 2009 was phrased in the following way: Have
you and /or your partner personally suered losses in wealth due to the nancial crisis?
If yes, how high was your total loss in 2008 in Euros?13 At this point it is unclear if
households reported paper or realized losses. However, we will elaborate on this in the
course of our analysis.
About 79.5% of the households responded that they did not incur nancial losses due
to the crisis. 20.5% reported a loss. The average loss reported by households conditional
on reporting a loss is 13,153 Euros. The median loss is 5,000 Euros. The distribution
of losses is skewed to the right and is plotted in gure A1 in the appendix. The un-
conditional average loss of all households in Germany is 2,562 Euros. In comparison,
the average loss of German households calculated on the basis of aggregate nancial
11The reference statistic to calibrate weights according to income and age classes is the German
Mikrozensus. For a detailed description see B orsch-Supan et al. (2009), pp. 48-52.
12Deaton (1997) mentions that \when the sectors [sub populations] are homogeneous, OLS is more
ecient, and when they are not, both estimators are inconsistent. In neither case is there an argument
for weighting." (p. 70).
13We do not compare households' balance sheets at the end of 2007 and 2008 as the net wealth
position of households can also be inuenced by consumption-saving decisions and bequests, etc.14
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account statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank is 3,105 Euros.14 The dierence may
at least partly be explained by the fact that some households have not reported paper
losses.
In order to evaluate how well households estimate their losses we simulate nancial
losses on the basis of their portfolios at the end of 2007. We apply the approach taken
by B orsch-Supan et al. (2010), i.e., we use households' portfolio composition at the end
of 2007 and apply average realized returns of these assets during 2008. We deduct the
simulated wealth level at the end of 2008 from the wealth level at the end of 2007 to
obtain paper losses and gains during 2008. To construct our simulated loss variable we
exclude gains as our direct question only covered losses. According to the simulation
about 29.6% of households in Germany were aected by losses in nancial wealth. The
dierence compared to reported losses can be due to two reasons: First, some of the
households did not report their paper losses when asked directly and some households
might be unaware of the fact that they were aected by the nancial crisis. We will
comment on this aspect after we introduce measures of nancial literacy and cognitive
abilities. Second, in SAVE we have information on rather broad classes of assets. We
calculated the returns on asset classes using average returns of these assets as we do not
have information of the precise composition of households' portfolios. Thus, for some
households the simulated loss might not reect their true situation very well.
The average simulated loss of households is 2,658 Euro. This is quite close to the
reported average loss of 2,562 Euros.15 Conditional on reporting a loss the average
simulated loss is 10,692 Euros, i.e. the value is below the average reported loss of 13,153
Euros. We also analyze the dierence between simulated and reported losses on the
individual level and nd that about 13% report losses below the simulated loss and
about 22% report losses above the simulated loss. For 64% of the respondent reported
and simulated losses both are zero. Again the deviations can be due to misreporting of
the households as well as due to the imprecise estimation of simulated returns to wealth
during 2008. Overall, we come to the conclusion that households on average seem to
have a plausible notion of their losses during the nancial crisis. We will comment on
the deviation in more details below.
14Estimated on the basis of Deutsche Bundesbank (2009): Geldverm ogen und
Verbindlichkeiten der privaten Haushalte. Tabelle aus der Finanzierungsrechnung;
http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik wirtschaftsdaten tabellen.php
15The correlation of simulated and reported losses is 0.52 (p-value 0.000).15
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Relative Financial Losses. We divide nancial losses by households' total nancial
wealth at the end of 2007. Total nancial wealth is constructed using deposits held in
savings accounts, building savings contracts, xed income securities, stocks, stock mutual
and real estate funds, life insurance contracts, private and employer-based pension wealth
as well as other nancial assets. On average households lost about 3.6% of their gross
nancial wealth. Conditional on suering a loss, households lost about 18.6% of their
gross nancial wealth. The median loss is 9.5%. Overall, about 9.2% of the households
lost more than 10% and about 1.8% lost more than half of their nancial assets. The
average simulated loss relative to nancial wealth at the end of 2007 is 3.7% which is
again quite close to the reported one.
Additionally we relate losses to total wealth. Thus, we add housing and business
wealth as well as other real assets (e.g. jewelery, antiques etc.) to our nancial wealth
variable. Related to their total gross wealth at the end of 2007, households on average
lost 1.7% of their wealth. Conditional on reporting a loss, the fraction of total wealth
lost is 8.9% with a median of 2.5%. 3.8% lost a fraction of wealth higher than 10% of
all assets. Less than 1% of all households lost more than half of their total wealth.
3.2.2 Realized Losses
As a follow up question we asked respondents: What did you do with the assets that lost
in value? We kept the assets. / We sold some of the assets. / We sold all of them.
This question was only asked conditional on reporting a loss. Thus, 458 households
gave an answer to this question. 75.2% responded that they kept the loser assets in their
portfolio. Thus, these households reported paper losses. 13.2% report that they sold
all of the assets that lost in value and 11.6% sold at least some of them (see Table 1).
For the analysis conducted later on we construct a variable equal to 1 if households sold
some or all of their assets.
Table 1 also relates the absolute and relative losses of households to their reaction.
We nd that the average loss of households who kept their assets is little over 12,000
Euros. The average loss of households who sold some of the assets is almost twice as
large (about 23,500 Euros). However, the loss of households who sold all their assets is
only around 9,000 Euros. Investors who kept their assets on average lost 17.4% of their
wealth which is about 23% less than the average relative losses of investors who sold
some or all of their assets and who suered an average relative loss of 22.5%.16
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Table 1: Households' Reaction to Financial Losses
This table contains the frequency and the proportion of respondents who gave the respective answers
to the question \What did you do with the assets that lost in value?" Additionally the average loss
and the average fraction of wealth lost are reported.
Freq. Percent Mean Loss Fraction of
Wealth Lost
I/we kept the assets 344 75.2 12196 17.4%
I/we sold some of the assets 53 11.6 23518 22.5%
I/we sold all of them 61 13.2 9187 22.5%
Total 458 100.0 13153 18.7%
Source: SAVE 2009, data is weighted.
3.3 Measuring Financial Literacy
We measure nancial sophistication using an \objective" |as opposed to a \subjec-
tive", i.e. self-assessed|measure of nancial literacy. A set of three quiz-like questions
was developed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) for the Health and Retirement Study in
2004. The questions are designed to assess the fundamental skills that are at the core of
individual saving and investment decisions. In the meantime, the same (or very similar)
questions were included in several household surveys around the world, including the
German SAVE survey. Two of the questions are classied as measuring basic nancial
concepts (van Rooij et al. (2007)). The rst question concerns the understanding of
interest and requires the ability to calculate. The second question examines the under-
standing of the joint eects of interest and ination. The third question is categorized
as measuring advanced nancial knowledge and deals with risk and diversication. The
wording of the questions can be found in appendix D.
We use the answers to the nancial quiz from the SAVE survey in 2007 because the
nancial crisis might have changed nancial knowledge of households. The survey was
conducted in the early summer of 2007 before the start of the nancial crisis. In 2007
respondents were requested to answer nancial literacy questions for the rst time in
SAVE.
Finally, we dene two measures of nancial literacy. We construct an index taking
values 0 to 3 according to the number of correct answers given by each respondent.
The answers given by the respondents are displayed in Table 2. The second variable
is a dummy, which takes the value 1 if all questions were answered correctly and 0
otherwise. In our sample 53.2% of the respondents were able to answer all three nancial
literacy questions correctly, whereas 46.8% had a least one incorrect answer or \do not17
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know".16 A comparison of these responses with results from earlier studies like Lusardi
and Mitchell (2006) and van Rooij et al. (2007) is dicult due to the missing \do not
know" option in SAVE. We compare the answers across countries on the basis of SAVE
2009 in Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2010).
Table 2: Financial Literacy 2007
This table contains the frequency and the proportion of respondents who were able to answer zero
to three questions on the nancial literacy task.
no. of correct answers Freq. Percent Cum.
0 138 6.9 6.9
1 178 8.8 15.7
2 626 31.1 46.8
3 1070 53.2 100.0
Source: SAVE 2007, data is weighted according to sample weights 2009, N= 2012.
Previous analysis of nancial literacy among SAVE respondents revealed that nan-
cial literacy is relatively low among women, individuals with low education, low income
and individuals living in east Germany (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2010)).
3.4 Measuring Cognitive Abilities
Cognitive abilities are measured using the cognitive reection test (CRT) developed and
tested by Frederick (2005). To our knowledge, SAVE is the rst representative sample
which contains this measure. The CRT consists of three quiz-like questions. All questions
have an intuitive but incorrect answer and a correct answer that is a little more tricky to
nd. The CRT has been found to be a very ecient way to estimate cognitive abilities
of individuals in questionnaires. It correlates well with more comprehensive intelligence
tests. The wording of the questions can be found in appendix D.
The CRT was only introduced in the SAVE survey in 2009. However, there is no
reason to assume that the crisis inuenced cognitive abilities of our respondents. Thus
we do not see any diculty in using this data.
Similar to our measures of nancial literacy we dene a measure of cognitive abilities.
We construct an index taking the values 0 to 3 corresponding to the number of correct
answers given. The results can be found in Table 3. 43% of our respondents gave
no correct answer. Around 20% gave one and 21% two correct answers. 15% of the
16In the questionnaire 2007 the interest and the ination question did not have a \do not know"
option. For this reason we treat missing answers as \do not know" and do not drop them from the
sample.18
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respondents were able to answer all three questions correctly. Moreover, we construct a
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if all questions were correctly answered. The
percentage of individuals with three correct responses in the study by Frederick (2005)
ranges between 48% (sample of 61 students at Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
and 5% (sample of 138 students at the University of Toledo). On average around 17%
of the participants|mostly young university students|in his samples give three correct
answers.
Table 3: Cognitive Reection Test
This table contains the frequency and the proportion of respondents who were able to answer zero
to three questions on the cognitive abilities task.
no. of correct answers Freq. Percent Cum.
0 871 43.3 43.3
1 434 21.6 64.9
2 403 20.0 84.9
3 303 15.1 100.0
Source: SAVE 2009, data is weighted, N= 2012.
There is a signicantly positive correlation (spearman rank correlation: 0.2899, p-
value 0.000) between our measures of nancial literacy and cognitive abilities. About
4.3% of the respondents answer none of the questions correctly and 11.2% give six
correct answers. Financial literacy increases with cognitive capacity: Among those with
low cognitive abilities (0 correct answers) 37% give three correct answers on the nancial
literacy task whereas among those with high cognitive abilities (3 correct answers) the
probability of correctly answering all nancial literacy questions is roughly 75%.
4 Empirical strategies and results
4.1 Who is aected by nancial losses due to the crisis?
4.1.1 Model to test hypothesis 1
In section 2.1 we argued that the probability of incurring a nancial loss during the crisis
depends on whether the household invested in risky assets, which in turn depends on
factors like participation cost, income volatility, and risk preferences. In order to test
hypothesis 1 we substitute the determinants of risky asset investment into the equation19
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to estimate the loss probability. Thus, we estimate the following reduced form probit:
L = 0 + 1z + 2w + 3k + 4c + : (1)
Where L is an indicator equal to one if a household incurred a loss, z is a vector of
socio-demographic variables, w is the log of gross nancial wealth, k is nancial literacy,
and c is cognitive abilities.  is a standard normal random error.
We proposed that households with high nancial literacy/high cognitive abilities are
more likely to hold risky assets in their portfolio and thus are more likely to incur losses
due to the nancial crisis.17 Therefore, we expect 3 and 4 to be positive. The awareness
of individuals of their exposure to risk during the crisis and the losses related to this might
depend on the knowledge of individuals about their own nancial situation which might
again depend on their levels of nancial literacy. However, it is unclear if individuals with
lower levels of nancial literacy are more likely to over- or underestimate their losses. An
analysis of the deviations between reported and simulated nancial losses with respect
to nancial literacy and cognitive abilities reveals that there are no systematic over- or
under-estimations of the losses depending on abilities. Furthermore, there is no relation
between nancial literacy and the squared dierence between simulated and reported
losses, i.e. nancially illiterate households are not deviating more strongly. Thus, we do
not think that our estimates are systematically biased.
4.1.2 Empirical results: model 1
We restrict our analysis to households with positive gross nancial wealth at the end of
2007 because only households with positive assets had something to lose during 2008. We
have 1673 observations in the sample. As proposed in hypothesis one, households with
high nancial literacy are more likely to incur losses due to the nancial crisis. Bi-variate
analysis reveals that 13.6% of the households with a respondent who was unable to
answer all nancial literacy questions report to be aected by a loss in wealth as a result
of the nancial crisis. In contrast, 32.2% of the respondents who answered all questions
correctly report nancial losses. Moreover, the fraction of households suering from
17Figure B2 in the appendix shows relative stock market participation over percentiles of gross -
nancial wealth for individuals with high and low nancial literacy. It can be observed that the stock
market participation of those with high nancial literacy is higher compared to those with low nancial
literacy in the top 70% of the wealth distribution. There are no dierences at the bottom, most likely
due to budget limitations.20
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losses increases from 23.2% for low cognitive abilities (less than three correct answers)
to 31% for high cognitive abilities (three correct answers).
To understand the eect of nancial literacy and cognitive abilities on being aected
by losses in wealth, we conduct the multivariate regression as specied in equation 1.
The results are reported in Table 4.
We measure nancial literacy by using a dummy variable for three correct answers
to the nancial literacy task and cognitive abilities by using a dummy variable for three
correct answers in the cognitive abilities task.18 Furthermore, we include nancial wealth
at the end of 2007, income, education and whether individuals are non German as
controls. These variables are used as proxies for the ability and willingness of households
to incur xed participation cost. Moreover, Campbell and Viceira (2003) argue that the
participation in risky asset markets can be inuenced by income risk of households. We
include two variables to proxy income risk: one measure for subjective income volatility
of households in the past 5 years19 and one variable controlling for self-employment of
the person answering the questionnaire. We also include a measure for risk aversion in
the domain of nancial matters.20 We proxy diversication by including the number of
asset categories that households own at the end of 2007 and we include a dummy equal
to one if households consulted a nancial advisor. Additionally, controls for age, living
in East Germany21, living in a rural region, being retired and gender are included.
Our regression reveals that nancially literate individuals have a more than 11%
higher chance to incur a loss during the crisis compared to nancially illiterate respon-
dents (signicant at 1%). Therefore, hypothesis 1 is conrmed with respect to the eect
of nancial literacy. The eect of cognitive abilities is insignicant. Besides, the proba-
bility to report losses increases with age, nancial wealth, the number of asset categories
and risk preferences and with consulting a nancial advisor. It decreases if households
18All our results maintain for alternative denitions of cognitive abilities and nancial literacy. More
specically, we ran regressions using variables taking values from 0 to 3 for cognitive abilities and
nancial literacy, respectively.
19The wording of the question is: \Over the past ve years did your personal income uctuate
considerably, uctuate somewhat, or not uctuate at all?"
20The wording of the question is: \To what extent do the following statements apply to you? Please
answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means \does not apply at all" and 10 means \applies very
well". I do not mind taking risks with respect to nancial matters." Dohmen et al. (2010) establish the
predictive validity of this measure. We take the measure from SAVE 2008, i.e. it is measured in spring
2008.
21There are still substantial dierences in the economic situation between the former communist and
non-communist part of Germany, thus it seems appropriate to control for these structural dierences.21
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Table 4: Probit \Financial Loss"
This table reports the eect of cognitive abilities, nancial literacy, and various covariates on report-
ing a loss due to the nancial crisis. The dependent variable is a dummy that indicates if a household
incurred a loss in wealth due to the nancial crisis. We report marginal eects after estimating a
probit evaluated at the median of all variables and the respective standard errors. Marginal eects
and standard errors are calculated using 5 imputed data sets and combined according to Rubin's
Rule (Rubin (1987, 1996)). Cognitive abilities and nancial literacy each are measured by a dummy
equal to one if all questions of the respective tasks were correctly answered. (d) indicates the change
of a dummy variable from 0 to 1. Ref. indicates the reference category if various dummies are
used. Model 1 contains all households with positive nancial assets (N=1,673). Model 2 contains
all households (N=2,012).
Model 1 Model 2
dy/dx se dy/dx se
Cognitive abilities 3 (d) 0.006 0.023 0.022 0.019
Financial literacy 3 (d) 0.114*** 0.027 0.087*** 0.023
Age: 35 and younger (d) -0.003 0.034 -0.024 0.027
Age: 36-50 (d) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Age: 51-65 (d) 0.049** 0.022 0.061*** 0.017
Age: 66 and older (d) 0.078*** 0.026 0.086*** 0.020
Log nancial wealth 2007 0.054*** 0.012 0.013*** 0.005
Men (d) -0.026 0.018 -0.024 0.016
Living in East Germany (d) 0.006 0.022 -0.002 0.017
Low level of schooling (d) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Intermediate schooling (d) -0.001 0.024 -0.008 0.019
High schooling (d) 0.006 0.024 0.006 0.019
Log monthly net income 0.005 0.021 0.021 0.016
Number of asset categories 0.030*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.005
Risk preferences 0.021*** 0.004 0.017*** 0.004
Financial advisor (d) 0.066*** 0.019 0.053*** 0.015
High income volatility (d) 0.029 0.023 0.017 0.018
Self-employed (d) 0.044 0.033 0.038 0.026
Living in a rural region (d) -0.083*** 0.032 -0.061** 0.025
Non German (d) 0.127 0.088 0.082 0.064
Retired (d) 0.032 0.029 0.022 0.022
N 1673 2012
R2 0.21 0.22
Source: SAVE 2007 to 2009, own calculation. * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; ***
signicant at 1%.22
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live in a rural region.
Our results are robust to including all households (Model 2). Again we nd that
individuals with higher nancial literacy are more likely to be aected by losses in
nancial wealth.
4.2 Who lost the most?
4.2.1 Model to test hypothesis 2
In section 2.2 we proposed that households better at managing their portfolios should
incur smaller losses relative to their nancial wealth. The ability to manage ones portfolio
in turn depends on nancial knowledge and cognitive capacity. In order to test hypothesis
2 we estimate a model of the form:
l = 0 + 1z + 2r + 3k + 4c + 5m +  + : (2)
Where l = loss=w07 is the loss relative to nancial wealth at the end of 2007, z is
a vector of socio-demographic variables, r is a proxy for the share of risky assets in the
portfolio and k and c are nancial literacy and cognitive abilities, respectively. m is an
indicator if the household has a male decision maker.  is a standard normal random
error.
We estimate model 2 in two dierent ways. First, we estimate a simple linear re-
gression using OLS and condition on households reporting a loss. Second, we use a
Heckman two-step estimation (Heckman (1976, 1979)) to correct for selection of report-
ing a loss, and include the inverse mills ratio  in the estimated equation. The rst step
is estimated using the model developed in the previous section (equation 1). We use
income volatility, living in a rural region, and being retired as exclusion restrictions. We
assume that these variables only inuence whether households participate in risky asset
markets, i.e. report a loss, but have no eect on the size of the loss. This is conrmed
by Chi2-test of the joint signicance of these variables in the rst and the second stage
of the equation.22
22In the rst stage the three variables are jointly highly signicant in all ve of our imputed data
sets. Wald-statistics range between 8.71 and 11.42; p-values are below 5% in all cases. Whereas in the
second stage equation their joint signicance is rejected in all ve cases (Wald statistics between 1.15
and 3.16, p-values not signicant).23
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We hypothesize that households with higher nancial literacy/cognitive abilities are
better diversied and therefore suer smaller losses as a percentage of their wealth, i.e.,
we expect 3 and 4 to be negative. Moreover, we expect households with male decision
makers to incur higher losses, i.e., 5 should be positive.
Potential problem of truncation. Respondents in SAVE 2009 were only asked
for their losses in nancial wealth and not for their gains. Therefore, our dependent
variable is potentially truncated. In SAVE 2010 we modied this question and instead
asked respondents for their gains and losses over the last two years. A glance at data
from SAVE 2010 gives us the opportunity to estimate an upper limit of the fraction of
respondents which might have reported gains when asked in 2009.23 The comparison
of losses reported in 2009 compared to losses and gains reported in 2010 reveals a very
high correlation of 0.6751 (p-value 0.000). About 1.4% of all respondents report no loss
during 2008 and a gain over a two year period between 2008 and 2010. This is the
maximum fraction of respondents that are subject to truncation because it also contains
those households who incurred no loss during 2008 but a gain during 2009. Thus, we do
not think that we have a substantial problem of truncation in our data.
4.2.2 Empirical results: model 2
The analysis of this model is restricted to households with positive nancial wealth in
2007. The descriptive analysis reveals that the fraction of wealth lost is around 10.3%
for individuals low nancial literacy and decreases slightly for highly literate households
(9.1%). The dierence between the two groups is insignicant. The analysis of relative
losses over levels of cognitive abilities shows that individuals with lower cognitive abilities
on average lost a higher fraction of their wealth (9.8%) than individuals with higher
cognitive abilities (8.1%). Again, the dierence between the two groups is insignicant.
We conduct multivatiate regression as specied in equation 2 to test hypothesis 2a
and 2b. The results of an OLS regression and of Heckman two-step estimations can be
found in Table 5. Our dependent variable in these regressions is the loss (measured in
Euros) divided by nancial wealth at the end of 2007.
We nd that the fraction of wealth lost is higher, the higher the share of nancial
23We can assume that this is an upper limit because of very high returns of the stock markets during
2009. We think that there is a negligible fraction of households which report a loss over the two year
period from 2007 to 2009, but would have reported a gain between 2007 and 2008.24
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wealth invested in stocks or other risky assets.24 The number of asset categories as well as
being younger than 36 and having a low schooling degree have weakly signicant negative
eects on the faction of wealth lost in the OLS but the eects become insignicant when
correcting for selection (Heckman 1 and 2 in Table 5). Self-employment and being of
non German origin are signicantly positively related to the size of the loss.
Contrary to our expectation nancial literacy and cognitive abilities are not nega-
tively related to the fraction of wealth lost|both eects are insignicant in the OLS
regression. When correcting for reporting a loss (Heckman 1) the eect of nancial
literacy becomes positively signicant at 10%. Thus, we do not nd support for hypoth-
esis 2a, that individuals with higher levels of nancial literacy are better at shielding
themselves from losses due to the nancial crisis..
To test hypothesis 2b we include two dummy variables to control for decision making
within the household. The reference group are single female decision makers. We nd
no signicant dierences in the size of the loss between single female or male decision
makers, as proposed in hypothesis 2b. In the OLS regression we nd week evidence
that joint decision makers incurred smaller losses compared to female decision makers.
However, the eect is not signicant in the selection models.
As a robustness check we changed the dependent variable of the selection equation
(Heckman 2). Here the selection is not whether households report a loss, but whether
households own stocks or stock mutual funds at the end of 2007. The results regarding
the eect of nancial literacy and cognitive abilities do not change in this specication.
However the signicance of some of the control variables changes. Mainly due to the
dierent sample size because of the dierent selection modeled.
To check if our results are inuenced by the performance of households with very
risky portfolios and accordingly very large losses, we conducted a sensitivity check and
restricted our estimation to households with a fraction invested in stocks that is smaller
than 80%, i.e. we exclude the top 9 to 10% of households with the highest share of
risky investments in their portfolio (depending on the sample). Financial literacy is still
positively related to the fraction of wealth lost, but the eect is smaller and insignicant
in all three specications.
24These variable are not included in the selection equation because for all individuals without risky
assets the fractions are 0. There is no variation in these variables for the households not selected.25
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4.3 Who realizes their loss?
4.3.1 Model to test hypothesis 3
In section 2.3 we argued that dierent reasons might have existed to sell ones assets
during the crisis and realize a loss. To investigate our competing hypotheses 3a and 3b
we estimate a model of the following form:
s = 0 + 1z + 2k + 3c + 4y +  + ; (3)
where s indicates whether the household has sold assets that lost in value, and y
indicates a shock to income. All other variables are dened as before. Again we estimate
two specications: a linear model conditional on reporting a loss and a Heckman two-
step. The Heckman two-step might be necessary because only households reporting a
loss were asked how they reacted to the crisis.
We use income volatility, living in a rural region, self-employment, being non German
and being retired as exclusion restrictions. We assume that these variables only inuence
whether households participate in risky asset markets, i.e. report a loss, but have no
eect on their reaction to the loss. This is conrmed by Chi2-Test of the joint signicance
of these variables in the rst and the second stage of the equation.25
As argued in section 2.3, individuals with higher nancial literacy and cognitive
abilities might be more or less likely to sell their assets, thus 2 as well as 3 can be
positive or negative.
4.3.2 Empirical results: model 3
The question about the realization of losses was asked conditional on reporting a loss.
As before we condition on positive gross nancial wealth at the end of 2007, i.e. 442
households are included in our regression.26 Descriptive analysis reveals that the fraction
of households who sold their assets that lost value is 21% for highly nancially literate
respondents compared to 36% on average for respondents answering less than 3 questions
correctly. Similarly, the percentage of households who sold at least some of their loser
stocks deceases from 26% for low cognitive abilities to 21% for high cognitive abilities.
25In the rst stage the variables are jointly highly signicant in all ve of our imputed data sets (Wald
statistics between 12.2 and 16.4, p-values below 5%). Whereas in the second stage equation their joint
signicance is rejected in all ve cases (Wald statistics between 6.1 and 7.2, p-values not signicant).
26The dierent sample size compared to model 2 is due to dierences in the number of missing values.27
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The results of linear regressions modeled as suggested in equation 3 are shown in
Table 6.27 In specication 1 and 3 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the
respondent households sold some or all of the asset which lost in value. In specication
2 and 4 we use a stricter denition: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one
only if a households sold all the assets which lost in value.
27We report OLS regressions for ease of interpretation. Our results do not change when estimating
probit regressions.28
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Cognitive abilities as well as nancial literacy have a negative eect on selling the loser
stocks which is in line with the descriptive results. However, only the eect of nancial
literacy is signicant. The ability to answer all nancial literacy questions correctly
decreases the probability to sell assets after a loss by between 11 and 13% depending on
the specication. Correcting for selection into reporting a loss only slightly changes our
results compared to the OLS. And using a stricter denition of realizing losses hardly
changes the results.
The second interesting point to notice is that individuals older than 66 are signi-
cantly more likely to sell their assets, compared to individuals between 36 and 50. The
reason is probably that they were pessimistic about medium term future stock returns
and have shorter future time horizons compared to younger investors. The eect disap-
pears when using the strict denition of realizing the losses. Apart from the variables
we already introduced, a variable is included to take account of shocks to income and
whether individuals had to sell the assets to smooth consumption. We have information
if households were aected by the crisis via the labor market. Specically we asked
respondents if they lost their job, whether their income declined and if they worked
shorter hours due to the crisis. We do not nd any signicant impact of these other
eects of the crisis on realizing losses.
For households who sold at least some of the assets, there was a follow up question
asking for the destination of the money:
What did you do with the money from selling the assets? We used most of it for
consumption. / We transferred most of it to our checking account or other forms of
assets.
This analysis conrms that most of the households who sold the assets did not aim
at smoothing consumption. Only about 17% of the respondents consumed most of the
money from the assets they sold. The majority (83%) transferred the money to other
assets.
Summing up, we are able to reject hypothesis 3a according to which households with
higher nancial literacy are more likely to realize their losses. We nd robust evidence
that higher nancial literacy is positively related to keeping the loser assets. Thus,
individuals with lower nancial literacy were more likely to realize their losses and leave
the equity market during the crisis.30
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5 Conclusions
Our analysis of the eects of the nancial crisis on households' portfolios and their
reactions reveals the following results:
 On average, households in Germany do not seem to have suered substantially
from the nancial crisis. Little more than 20% of households in Germany report
nancial losses. Mean losses are about 2,560 Euros or 3.6% of gross nancial assets.
 Comparing reported and simulated losses reveals that households have a plausible
notion of their losses during the nancial crisis.
 Households with lower nancial literacy and cognitive abilities are less likely to
participate in risky asset markets and thus less frequently report nancial losses
due to the crisis. The eect of nancial literacy is signicant even if we control for
socio-demographic dierences, risk preferences and income risk. Thus, our results
are consistent with previous results in the literature, e.g. Calvet et al. (2007), van
Rooij et al. (2007). The main explanation is that nancially illiterate households
are skeptical about nancial markets and thus stay out of risky assets to avoid
investment mistakes.
 Contrary to the predictions derived from existing theory, households with lower
nancial literacy and cognitive abilities did not lose larger fractions of their wealth
if they participated in the stock market. Moreover, our indicator of overcondence
does not reveal any signicant eects on the size of the loss.
 Financially illiterate households were more likely to sell the assets which lost in
value during the crisis. Calvet et al. (2009) observe that nancially unsophisticated
households in Sweden are more likely to exit risky asset markets when incurring a
loss. We conrm these ndings using German household data.
However, one should not jump to conclusions too fast. Even though the eects of
the nancial crisis on private households in Germany appear to be limited in the short
run they can have substantial consequences in the long run. In Germany, participation
in risky assets has been traditionally low but has increased slightly in recent years. If
the shock to nancial market returns has a negative impact on nancial market par-
ticipation, the rising trend in stock market participation might slow down or even be31
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1299
Febuary 2011
reversed (we observe households leaving the stock market due to the crisis). Malmendier
and Nagel (2010) nd evidence that past returns matter for households' participation
in stock and bond markets. Consequentially, there might be substantial losses in future
welfare for households who leave or stay out. This might impact households' nancial
well-being particularly in the light of demographic transition and declining pension ben-
ets. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) estimate that consumption patterns of stockholders
and nonstockholders dier substantially: stock holding households have overall larger
volatility of consumption, but at the same time they have higher average levels of con-
sumption. Cocco et al. (2005) estimate a welfare loss of 1.5 to 2% of annual consumption
due to lack of stock market participation.
Thus, due to dierent investment strategies of nancially literate and illiterate in-
vestors income inequality might increase. The main reasons for this are: rst, nancially
illiterate will miss the higher long-term returns of the stock market; second, there is a
high probability that households who realized returns during an economic downturn
do not reinvest in risky assets very soon, which means that they do not participate in
potential recovery processes directly after economic crises. B orsch-Supan et al. (2010)
show that nancial losses due to the 2007/2008 nancial crisis are around 0.2 percentage
points in the long-run. The loss of not participating in the stock market would be larger
if one looks at the historical outperformance of equity in stocks vs. government bonds
over the past century for Germany, the US and other countries. The equity premium
from 1900-2005 was at least 5 percentage points per annum on average (Mehra (2006)).
The foregone future losses are even higher if households sell their stock when the market
value is very low. Overall, we nd that despite the moderate impact of the nancial
crisis on households in Germany the long-term eects on wealth distribution can be
substantial. The reason is that households with higher levels of nancial literacy are
better at reacting to a shock like the nancial crisis compared to households with low
nancial literacy.32
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A Appendix A: Financial Losses
Figure A1: Density Function Financial Losses
This gure shows the distribution of losses conditional on reporting a loss. The function is smoothed
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Source: SAVE 2009, weighted data.
Observations up to the 95% percentile included (N=412).
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B Appendix B: Financial Literacy and Stock Mar-
ket Participation over Deciles of Financial Wealth
Figure B2: Financial Literacy and Stock Market Participation over Deciles of Financial
Wealth
This gure shows average stock market participation of households with high and low levels of
nancial literacy over deciles of gross nancial wealth. Households with high (low) nancial literacy
are (not) able to answer all nancial literacy questions correctly. Financial wealth and stock market
participation are measured at the end of 2007 (SAVE 2008). Financial literacy is taken from SAVE
2007. N=2,012. The graph is based on one imputed data set. Results do not dier when using any
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C Appendix C: Summary Statistics
Table C1: Summary Statistics
This table contains summary statistics for 2,012 respondents in SAVE 2009.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 50.8 15.9 21 90
Men 0.47 0.50 0 1
East 0.28 0.45 0 1
Rural 0.15 0.36 0 1
Married 0.57 0.50 0 1
Single 0.21 0.40 0 1
Divorced 0.13 0.33 0 1
Widowed 0.08 0.26 0 1
Separated 0.03 0.16 0 1
Partner 0.65 0.48 0 1
Employed 0.55 0.50 0 1
Fulltime 0.34 0.47 0 1
Parttime 0.20 0.40 0 1
Unemployed 0.08 0.28 0 1
Homemaker 0.19 0.40 0 1
Retired 0.28 0.45 0 1
Household size 2.43 1.22 1 9
Households with children 0.37 0.48 0 1
Number of children 1.67 1.38 0 8
Lower secondary education 0.08 0.27 0 1
Upper secondary education 0.60 0.49 0 1
Post secondary, non tert. education 0.12 0.33 0 1
First stage tertiary education 0.17 0.38 0 1
Other education 0.03 0.17 0 1
Household income (Euro/month) 2,127 1,389 22 22,500
Gross wealth - end of 2007 (Euro) 187,281 384,198 0 7,720,000
Gross nancial wealth - end of 2007 (Euro) 38,855 114,128 0 2,870,000
Source: SAVE 2008 and 2009, data is weighted and imputed.40
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D Appendix D: Measures of Financial Literacy and
Cognitive Abilities
Financial Literacy
1. Understanding of Interest Rate (Numeracy)
\Suppose you had e100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per
year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you
left the money to grow: more than e102, exactly e102, less than e102?"
2. Understanding of Ination
\Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and
ination was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than,
exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this account?"
3. Understanding of Risk and Diversication
\Do you think that the following statement is true or false? Buying a single
company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund." do not
know
Cognitive Reection Test
1. \A bat and a ball cost 110 cents in total. The bat costs 100 cents more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?"
2. \If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets?"
3. \In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake?"Working PaPer SerieS
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